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Abstract
Using a novel country-industry level panel database with information
on newly incorporated rms in 17 European countries between 1997
and 2004, we study how taxation of corporate income aects the
size of entrants at the country-industry level. Our results, that are
robust to changes in several assumptions, suggest that a reduction in
the eective corporate income tax rate leads to a signicant reduction
of the capital size of entrants, and to a decrease in their capital-labor
ratio.
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11 Introduction
In virtually all countries, public policy aims at fostering entrepreneurship
by encouraging the formation of new companies in order to stimulate in-
novation, competition, employment, and economic growth. Studies that
evaluate such policies abound. In particular, a recent strand of literature
exploits the increasing availability of rm-level data to assess how dif-
ferent labor, credit, and product market regulations aect entry and the
characteristics of entrants and incumbents.1 This literature has paid little
attention to corporate tax policy. This omission strikes as important, since
exibility and ease of implementation make taxation an appealing policy
instrument for encouraging the formation of entrepreneurial companies.2
In Da Rin, Di Giacomo and Sembenelli (2009) we analyze how corpo-
rate taxation aects entry rates (the \extensive margin"). In the present
study we shift the analysis to the initial size of entrants, measured by
capital, labor, and their ratio (the \intensive margin"). Both eects are
policy-relevant. The eect on the extensive margin reects an economy's
ability to create growth opportunities through new businesses. The eect
on the intensive margin reects both the quality and the speed of growth
(see Kerr and Nanda (2009, 2010)). The contribution of each eect to
economic growth is an empirical issue, whose analysis is important for a
correct design of economic policies.
The theoretical literature on corporate taxation has identied several
possible (countervailing) channels that may link tax policy to the charac-
teristics of entrants (see Section 2). The net sign and size of these eects
are however ambiguous, and remain an empirical question.
Our aim is to empirically investigate these channels in a panel data
setting, that helps to overcome the weaknesses of purely cross-sectional
studies. Our data consist of a novel rm-level dataset covering 17 Eu-
ropean countries between 1997 and 2004. The dierent evolution of tax
policies over time in Europe provides a good source of identication for our
empirical exercise. Several countries reduced statutory tax rates during the
last decade, while at the same time also changing the eective tax base,
thus creating a variety of situations which we exploit econometrically. Our
analysis recognizes that tax policy is likely to react to business conditions,
and therefore cannot be treated as an exogenous policy instrument. To the
1See, among many others, Ardagna and Lusardi (2009, 2010), Alesina et al. (2005),
Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006).
2Djankov et al. (2008) and Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) are the only exceptions
we are aware of.
2best of our knowledge, we are the rst to take into account the endogeneity
of tax policy in this context.
We nd that a lower corporate tax rate reduces the capital size of
entrants, and also reduces the capital-labor ratio. These eects are statis-
tically signicant and economically relevant; they are also non-linear, as
their magnitude decreases with the tax rate.
A possible interpretation of our results is that the tax system consti-
tutes a barrier to entry: as found by Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006),
high entry costs may make entry attractive only for larger rms. Together
with the ndings on the eects of corporate taxation on the extensive mar-
gin (entry rates) that we develop separately in Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and
Sembenelli (2009), the results of this paper point to a possible policy trade-
o between inducing more entry but of smaller, less capitalized rms, that
warrants further investigation.
2 Theoretical framework
We base our analysis on the framework built by Cullen and Gordon (2007),
which provides a synthesis of previous models of the eects of taxation on
the decision of entry (by incorporation), on the scale of the rm, and on its
capital-labor ratio. The decision they study is that of an entrepreneur that
chooses wheter to set up her rm as an incorporated or un-incorporated
entity.3 They identify three channels through which corporate income
taxation aects the incorporation decision and the optimal choice of scale.
The rst channel (\income shifting") consists of the possibility to shift
income between the personal and the corporate tax bases to take advan-
tage of the (typically positive) dierence between personal and corporate
tax rates; this encourages entry by incorporation when expected income is
suciently high, since un-incorporated rms are mostly taxed at (progres-
sive) personal rates. This channel is stronger the larger the rm's scale.
The second channel (\risk subsidy") arises from the contrast between
(progressive) personal income tax rates and (at) corporate income tax
rates. This makes expected tax liabilities fall as the entrepreneur under-
takes riskier projects, providing a tax subsidy to entry by incorporation.
The subsidy exists irrespective of risk attitudes, and is greater the larger
3Not all new companies that survive choose incorporation, and studies document that
the incorporation decision is a genuine choice. In Da Rin, Di Giacomo and Sembenelli
(2009) we survey these studies and show that the average size of incorporated rms in
Europe is about 20 times that of unincorporated companies.
3the rm's scale. It depends on the riskiness of the project, the progressive-
ness of personal income tax rates and the structure of corporate taxation.
The third channel (\risk-sharing") operates when nancial market im-
perfections prevent full risk-sharing with investors. In this case higher
taxation encourages entry, and entry at a higher scale, because it al-
lows entrepreneurs to share entrepreneurial risk with the government. As
the corporate tax rate increases, the entrepreneur bears less idiosyncratic
risk|being able to share more of it with the collectivity.
To link these three channels to the eects of corporate taxation on
the intensive margin of entry, consider the following. A higher corporate
income tax leads to a lower capital scale of entrants through the \income
shifting" and the \risk subsidy" channels, but it makes risk-taking more
attractive via the \risk-sharing" channel, leading to larger capital size of
entrants. The net eect depends on the relative sizes of these osetting
channels. The case is slightly dierent in the case of labor size. Since
labor costs are deductible expenses rather than foregone income of the
entrepreneur, labor size is aected only by the \risk subsidy" and \risk-
sharing" channels. Also in this case the net eect is a priori undetermined;
it is also likely to be weaker than in the case of capital size. These channels
also aect entrants' capital intensity, dened as the capital-labor ratio.
Higher corporate taxation is expected to increase the capital-labor ratio
since hiring new workers does not create income-shifting benets, unlike
expanding the rm by increasing its capital size. This eect is clearly be
larger the stronger are the benets from income-shifting.
Two implications are relevant for our analysis. First, the sign and size
of the eect of a change in corporate income taxation on the size of entrants
are not a priori clear. Second, as we explain in Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and
Sembenelli (2009), the eect is unlikely to be constant across dierent
values of the eective tax rate, and one could expect non-linear eects.
3 Data and variables
We take our dependent variables from yearly editions of the Amadeus
database, published by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. We col-
lect data on individual companies from 17 European countries (Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom). We focus on companies that incorporated between
1997 and 2004 and were active in 39 manufacturing and business-related
service industries. Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli (2009) describe in
4more detail these data and the construction of our independent variables.
We use information from Amadeus to build our two dependent variables.
The initial capital size of entrants (Capital-Size) is given by the median
value, at country-industry level, of entrants' (log transformed) total assets
in the year after incorporation. The initial labor size of entrants (Labor-
Size) is given by the median number, at country-industry level, of entrants'
(log transformed) employees in the year after incorporation.
Table 1 reports some gures about the composition of our sample of
entrants. We deal with more than 2.5 million rms. About 2 million of
them report information on Capital-Size, while data on Labor-Size are
available for less than one million companies. Over time, we observe an
increasing number of entrants with a decreasing size, especially after 2001.4
Our explanatory variables are taxation and business policy. For corpo-
rate taxation we build the \eective average tax rate" (Eective Tax Rate)
using the methodology proposed by Devereux and Grith (1998). We com-
pute Eective Tax Rate using information from the Worldwide Corporate
Tax Guide published by Ernst&Young, a leading multinational tax con-
sulting rm. Eective Tax Rate is a non-linear function of the statutory
tax rate, which varies across countries and time, and of the expected rate
of return, that varies across industries and time.
Our second dependent variable, Pro-Business Policy Index, is the Index
of Economic Freedom published yearly by the Heritage Foundation and the
Wall Street Journal. We use this measure to account for a country's policy
towards new business creation.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Figure 1 shows
graphically the relationship between Eective Tax Rate and the two mea-
sures of entrant rms' size. It suggests a positive relationship in the case
of Capital-Size, while no clear pattern is discernible for Labor-Size.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Econometric strategy
We estimate two dierent specications of the following relationship:
yict = t + g(Taxict 1)0 + x
0
ct 1 + ic + "ict (1)
4This may be due to more rened data collection practices, or to complex industry
and country dynamics. Since we are unable to disentangle these eects, relying on panel
data is reassuring, since it allows us to control for changes in data collection practises
both over time and across countries.
5where yict is one of our two dependent variables:(i) Capital-Size, entrants'
(median) capital size at time t, in industry i and country c; (ii) Labor-Size,
entrants' (median) labor size at the end of year t, in industry i, country
c. Our main explanatory variable is Taxict 1, the lagged value of Eective
Tax Rate, that varies across time, industries and countries. The variable
t is a time eect that we model introducing a set of year dummies. The
vector xct 1 is the Pro-Business Policy Index, that proxies for any time-
varying, country-specic policies towards rm creation.
The last two terms in Equation (1) are unobservable error components.
The term ic is a time-invariant, country-industry specic eect that cap-
tures any unobserved characteristics that are relevant for the entry and
the scale decisions. Since our explanatory variables may be correlated
with ic, we use the standard within-group transformation to remove it.
The term "ict is an idiosyncratic error term that varies across the three di-
mensions of our panel dataset. We report standard errors that are robust
to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and intra-country equi-correlation.
To consistently estimate the parameters  and , once the model
has been transformed in deviations from country-industry specic means,
we need lack of correlation between the regressors and the idiosyncratic
error term at all leads and lags. Under this assumption the standard
Within-Group (WG) estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally
distributed. Since this strong exogeneity assumption is not fully convincing
in our setting, we alternatively use a set of instruments to deal with the po-
tential endogeneity of Eective Tax Rate (and also of Pro-Business Policy
Index). For this, we borrow from the recent political economy literature
four measures of the political process: the ideological orientation of the
government (Center-Left Government, a dummy for center-left chief exec-
utive party, from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions); the
degree of political veto power (Veto-Power Index, a count of the number of
political parties in the coalition, from the World Bank's Database of Polit-
ical Institutions); the perceived stability of the government (Government-
Stability Index, a survey measure from the International Country Risk
Guide); and the date of election (Election-Date, a dummy equal to one
in election years). This set of instruments has been selected on the basis
of appropriate specication tests for instrument validity (Hansen J and C
statistics) and relevancy (Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap tests). The
economic rationale for these instruments is that both some structural fea-
tures of the political process (such as the degree of political veto power
or election dates) and the outcomes of the process (such as government
stability) are likely to aect the implementation of scal reforms without
6directly aecting entering entrepreneurs' decisions on the scale of their
rms.
4.2 Results
Tables 3 and 4 report our empirical results for Capital-Size and Labor-Size,
respectively. For each variable we present four estimated equations which
are based on dierent functional form assumptions and/or dierent estima-
tion methods. Columns (1) and (2) report the baseline linear specication
in the tax rate, estimated with WG and with GMM-IV. Columns (3) and
(4) report the results of a more general quadratic specication, again esti-
mated with WG and with GMM-IV. Finally, the pseudo-rst stage for the
corporate tax rate is reported in column (5) of Table 3.5
In the linear specication for Capital-Size the coecient of taxation is
positive and signicant at conventional levels. This turns out to be the
case with both estimation methods, with the GMM-IV coecient (0.157)
being substantially higher than the WG one (0.027). This might suggest a
violation of the strict exogeneity assumption or an attenuation bias, both
aecting our WG estimates. However, whereas the null of weak identica-
tion is rejected according to both the Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap
tests, the Hansen test rmly rejects the null of instruments validity. One
candidate explanation for this is the incorrect specication of the functional
form.
Based on this hypothesis and on Cullen and Gordon (2007), who iden-
tify several reasons for non-linearities in the relationship between the cor-
porate tax rate and entry size, we then estimate a quadratic specication.
With both WG and GMM-IV we nd that the relationship between capital
size and taxation is positive, signicant, and (slowly) decreasing in Eec-
tive Tax Rate. Also the Pro-Business Policy Index aects positively the
size of entrants. Moreover, both the validity of our set of instruments and
the exogeneity of the Pro-Business Policy Index variable are not rejected
by the data at the 1% level of signicance, according to Hansen's J and C
statistics. Since the dependent variable is expressed in logs, the estimated
coecients should be interpreted as semi-elasticities. Computed at the
median, a one unit increase in the Eective Tax Rate increases Capital-
Size by an amount ranging from 3% (WG estimation, column (3)) to as
much as 16% (GMM-IV, column (4)). These results, taken together, point
clearly to a smaller capital size of entrants as the tax burden lowers.
5We do not report the pseudo-rst stage results in Table 4 since they are substantially
identical to those in Table 3, except for a dierent number of observations.
7Table 4 replicates the same estimation strategy for Labor-Size. Our
results are now more mixed. In fact, in the linear WG specication the
coecient is negative ({0.008) and statistically signicant, albeit economi-
cally negligible. On the contrary the GMM-IV estimate is positive, statis-
tically signicant and economically sizeable (0.032). A weaker eect than
in the case of Capital-Size is what one would expect based on Cullen and
Gordon's predictions. Once again, the dierence in sign and size between
WG and GMM-IV estimates might be originated by the violation of some
of the more restrictive assumptions required for the consistency of the WG
estimator. Moreover, as for Capital-Size, the Hansen test strongly rejects
the null of instruments validity in the linear specication.
When we allow for a more exible (quadratic) functional form, we can-
not reject the validity of our set of instruments and the exogeneity of the
Pro-Business Policy Index. Also, the coecients of the linear and the
quadratic terms are respectively positively and negatively signed, regard-
less of the estimation method we use. However, when computed at the me-
dian, a one unit increase in the Eective Tax Rate reduces Labor-Size by
1% with WG estimation (column (3)) but increases it by 8% with GMM-IV
estimation (column (4)). Indeed the curvature of the relationships implied
by WG estimation is such that the eect turns out to be positive only
around the rst decile (24%) of the distribution of the eective tax rate.
The sign of the eect is therefore{at least partially{sensitive to the chosen
estimation method and this precludes us from taking a strong stand on
the role of corporate taxation on Labor-Size.
Finally, our results suggest unambiguously that the eect on Labor-Size
is smaller in size compared to the eect on Capital-Size. We can conclude
therefore that a reduction in corporate taxation is likely to decrease the
capital/labor ratio, as suggested by Cullen and Gordon's model.6
4.3 Robustness
We check the robustness of our results against three sets of assumptions.
In all cases the eect of taxation on entry size retains its magnitude and
remains signicant. First, we experimented with alternative measures of
Capital-Size and Labor-Size. We estimate the main specications when
Capital-Size and Labor-Size are computed as the average (instead of me-
dian) of the (log transformed) total assets, and number of employees (re-
6To provide additional empirical evidence on this issue we have also run an additional
set of equations with the capital/labor ratio as dependent variable. All our results
conrm a positive eect of the corporate tax rate on the capital/labor ratio.
8spectively), of all rms in the same country-industry-year. Second, we
examined the assumptions underlying the computation of Eective Tax
Rate. These include alternative composition of the investment in terms of
asset type, the way the new company is nanced, and a wide range of alter-
native economic depreciation rates. Finally, we address the exogeneity of
Pro-Business Policy Index. Even if our endogeneity tests do not reject the
null of exogeneity for Pro-Business Policy Index, we run additional GMM-
IV estimates, where Pro-Business Policy Index is treated as endogenous
and instrumented with the same variables used for Eective Tax Rate and
Eective Tax Rate Squared.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we empirically investigate the relationship between eective
corporate income taxation and the size of newly incorporated companies,
using a newly constructed panel dataset that allows us to improve signif-
icantly on the existing literature. We nd strong evidence that a lower
corporate income taxation decreases the capital size of entrants and their
capital intensity. This suggests that policy-makers should consider that
lowering taxes may enhance entry rates (as we show in Da Rin, Di Gia-
como, and Sembenelli (2009)) but at the same time induce the entry of
smaller, less capitalized, and therefore more likely weaker rms.
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1997 131,812 96,765 3,970.08 148.50 63,326 52.79 3.00
1998 244,339 197,286 5,369.80 70.91 75,918 32.77 3.00
1999 281,266 228,353 5,261.95 78.49 88,599 32.60 3.00
2000 305,204 243,244 6,300.46 76.03 90,963 35.64 3.00
2001 301,859 245,815 4,925.00 77.57 90,830 25.39 3.00
2002 369,899 315,862 2,391.11 64.12 100,728 19.14 3.00
2003 437,146 378,027 2,223.85 47.96 102,253 16.08 2.00
2004 446,811 363,761 2,585.50 72.00 110,975 17.48 2.00
Total 2,518,336 2,069,113 3,830.03 70.30 723,592 27.34 3.00
Note: Capital-Size and Labor-Size are the value of total assets and the total number of employees
(respectively) of entrants in the year after incorporation. Year is year of incorporation. Figures are
in numbers, except for average and median values of Capital-Size (in thousands of euros, deated
using the HCPI index by Eurostat).
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (industry-country-year level)
Variable Average S.D. 25th perc. Median 75th perc. N. Obs.
Capital-Size 5.37 1.06 4.65 5.17 5.97 3,446
Labor-Size 1.50 0.81 1.04 1.39 1.95 3,214
Eective Tax Rate 30.16 4.97 27.70 30.21 33.59 3,446
Pro-Business Policy Index 68.87 5.59 65.40 68.60 72.80 3,446
Note: Capital-Size and Labor-Size are computed as the median (within a specic country-industry-
year) of the log transformation of the value of total assets and of the total number of employees
(respectively) of entrants in the year after incorporation. The Eective Tax Rate is the \eective
average tax rate" as dened by Devereux and Grith (1998) and it is expressed in percentage.
The Pro-Business Policy Index is the Index of Economic Freedom published yearly by the Heritage
Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. The index ranges from 0 (minimum economic freedom)
to 100 (maximum economic freedom).
11Table 3. Estimation results. Dependent variable: Capital-Size.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WG GMM-IV WG GMM-IV FIRST-STAGE
Eective Tax Rate 0.027*** 0.157*** 0.009 0.833***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16)
Eective Tax Rate - Squared 0.000 -0.011***
(0.00) (0.00)
Pro-Business Policy Index 0.008 0.048*** 0.009* 0.048*** -0.362***









Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J Statistic 30.16 6.97
degrees of freedom [p-value] 3 [0.00] 2 [0.03]
Endogeneity Test (Hansen C Statistic) 12.47 1.05
degrees of freedom [p-value] 1 [0.00] 1 [0.31]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 93.47 26.65
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 55.45 20.44
Observations 3,446 3,446 3,446 3,446 3,446
Note: In columns (1) through (4) the dependent variable is Capital-Size, dened as the median
(within a country-industry-year) of the log transformation of the value of total assets. The speci-
cations in columns (1), (3) and (5) are within group regressions. Columns (2) and (4) are GMM
instrumental variables regressions, where Eective Tax Rate and its square are instrumented. Col-
umn (5) shows the rst stage regression where the dependent variable is the Eective Tax Rate.
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and intra-country
equi-correlation. * Signicant at 10%. ** Signicant at 5%. *** Signicant at 1%.
12Table 4. Estimation results. Dependent variable: Labor-Size.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WG GMM-IV WG GMM-IV
Eective Tax Rate -0.008*** 0.032*** 0.046*** 0.625***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17)
Eective Tax Rate - Squared -0.001*** -0.009***
(0.00) (0.00)
Pro-Business Policy Index 0.002 0.015*** 0.001 0.019***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J Statistic 14.23 0.15
degrees of freedom [p-value] 3 [0.00] 2 [0.93]
Endogeneity Test (Hansen C Statistic) 8.03 0.12
degrees of freedom [p-value] 1 [0.00] 1 [0.73]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 116.55 11.26
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 59.06 20.66
Observations 3,214 3,214 3,214 3,214
Note: The dependent variable is Labor-Size, dened as the median (within a country-industry-year)
of the log transformation of the number of employees. The specications in columns (1) and (3) are
within group regressions. Columns (2) and (4) are GMM instrumental variables regressions, where
Eective Tax Rate and its square are instrumented. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust
to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and intra-country equi-correlation. * Signicant at 10%. **
Signicant at 5%. *** Signicant at 1%.
Figure 1. Capital-Size, Labor-Size, and Eective Tax Rate: a graphical
view.
Note: The gure plots Capital-Size (left panel) and Labor-Size (right panel) against the (lagged) Eective
Tax Rate. All observations refer to country-industry-year level data.
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